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ABSTRACT:  The federal funds rate has become known conventionally as the Federal 
Reserve’s “instrument” of policy.  This fails to recognize that the funds rate is an 
endogenously determined price that can be influenced by shifts in the demand for reserves 
or other conditions in credit markets; indeed, recognizing just this possibility, Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992) chose to label the funds rate as an indicator variable, one that merely 
signaled the thrust of monetary policy actions.  Because the Fed’s ability to control the 
funds rate and the issue of endogeneity is central to modeling questions in monetary 
economics, we apply various statistical methods to offer evidence on whether the funds rate 
is best characterized as an instrument, intermediate target or indicator variable. 
JEL Codes:  E52, E58, E43 
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The Evolving Role and Definition of the Federal Funds Rate 
In the Conduct of U.S. Monetary Policy 
 
 
 Discussions of the federal funds rate over the past four decades have altered its 
definition within the hierarchy of the monetary policy mechanism and, in doing so, have 
suggested fundamentally different null hypotheses about relationships among 
macroeconomic time series.  For example, in the classic debates between Keynesian and 
monetarist schools of thought in the 1960s and 70s, the funds rate was viewed 
conventionally as an intermediate target of monetary policy.1  Later, in one of the most 
widely-cited papers of the early 1990s, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) referred to the funds 
rate as an indicator variable for monetary policy actions.  By the end of the decade, 
however, it had become conventional wisdom to refer to the funds rate as the Fed’s 
monetary policy instrument and, more important, to model the funds rate accordingly as an 
exogenously-determined variable. 2  
 Whatever the proper denotation for the funds rate might be at any moment in time, 
the alternative designations given to the funds rate are not interchangeable.  Each implies a 
very specific role within the structure of how monetary policy is conducted and, for 
empirical purposes, each implies specific null hypotheses about relationships between the 
funds rate and the behavior of other aggregate time series.  Surprisingly, however, many of 
these relationships have been accepted on faith and have not been tested in any systematic 
way.  This paper offers evidence on the alternatives and re-examines whether, at this 
moment in history, the funds rate is best classified as instrument, intermediate target or 
indicator variable of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions.  The evidence suggests 
that the funds rate contains little unique information relative to its role as an indicator 
variable.  Moreover, evidence of significant non-linearities among variables in a small VAR 
suggest that attempts to implement monetary policy through a Taylor Rule framework – 
beyond the conceptual difficulties already noted elsewhere 3 -- would complicate the task 
far beyond what has been implied to this point. 
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Terminology 
 Tobin (1969) identified three types of variables inherent in discussions of monetary 
policy:  Instruments, targets and intermediate variables.  In his taxonomy, instruments are 
variables controlled completely by actions of the central banker.  Targets are variables that 
the central banker is trying to control, either to reach a particular level or to minimize 
variations around a desired level; because variables of this type came to be called 
“intermediate targets” in standard discussions, this paper uses the term “goal” in place of 
“targets” when referring to the objectives of monetary policy.  Intermediate variables, in 
Tobin’s framework, are those that lie between the instrument(s) and the goal(s).  Finally, 
one other type of variable not discussed by Tobin – an indicator – is a variable that may not 
be controlled by the Fed’s actions but is considered by the public to be informative about 
the thrust of monetary policy and its future impacts on the central banks goal variable(s).  
This nomenclature, relative to the funds rate, is investigated in this paper because 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) among others have referred to the funds rate in this fashion. 
 Having drawn these distinctions, the conduct of monetary policy can follow one of 
two paths.  The simpler alternative is one which eliminates the intermediate variable and 
exploits a direct link between the instrument and goal as in (a) below.   
(a)  Instrument => Policy Objective 
One example is Boschen and Talbot (1981), which examined the association between the 
growth rate of the monetary base and the inflation rate; another example is the nominal 
GDP targeting plan developed by McCallum (1988).   
The more complicated alternative is an intermediate targeting strategy in which the 
central bank’s instrument is used to influence the path of an intermediate target because 
the link between the instrument and ultimate goal of policy is imprecise.  The path of the 
intermediate target variable, however, it believed to be connected closely with the desired 
path of the goal variable so, by influencing it, the central bank’s objective can be moved in 
the desired direction.  This framework is shown in (b). 
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(b)  Instrument => Intermediate Target => Policy Objective 
In the case of monetary targeting, the Fed would use open market operations to determine 
a growth rate for bank reserves or the base (its instrument) to pursue a path for money 
growth (the intermediate target) it thought was consistent with a rate of inflation 
determined to be the ultimate goal of the Fed’s policy actions.  In the case of fed funds rate 
targeting, the Fed again would use open market operations to manipulate the supply of 
reserves to keep the funds rate at its targeted level.  This level of the funds rate, through 
some economic model, would be connected to a desired outcome for the Fed’s actions. 
Other things the same, the choice between policy strategies (a) and (b) depends on 
the nature of the covariance between the two sources of error in the second mechanism – 
the “control error” between the actual and desired paths of the intermediate target and the 
“projection error” between the desired and actual paths of the policy objective. 4  A deeper 
argument, however, divided monetarists and Keynesians in the 1960s and the same 
argument still is germane to any current investigation of empirical properties of the funds 
rate.  One criticism of the so-called monetarist approach was the assertion that the 
quantity of money was determined endogenously and, as such, its out-of-sample path could 
not be predicted reliably.  Instead, holders of this position argued, the Fed could control 
short-term interest rates and, on that basis, should conduct monetary policy with the 
funds rate as its intermediate target.  In the other camp, advocates for money as the Fed’s 
intermediate target presented evidence that narrow aggregates, over periods of a quarter, 
were related closely to non-borrowed reserves and, by implication, whatever endogeneity of 
very short-run money growth might exist, it could be offset by use of the Fed’s exogenous 
instrument (non-borrowed reserves) to keep the intermediate target (narrow money) on its 
desired path.   
Is the Funds Rate a Policy Instrument? 
 Using Tobin’s taxonomy as a guide and either (a) or (b) as strategies for the 
implementation of monetary policy, it seems clear that, for the federal funds rate to be 
 5 
designated as the instrument of monetary policy, it must satisfy at least one statistical 
condition:  It must be strictly exogenous to other relevant economic time series.  
Superficially, if the period of observation is sufficiently short, there is little disagreement 
that the Fed can control the value of the funds rate by its ability to conduct open market 
operations and control the entire supply side of the reserves market.  Monetary policy 
goals, however, typically are stated in terms of the inflation rate, unemployment or output, 
all variables that evolve over the cycle and, when evaluated over periods of months or 
quarters, it becomes less clear that the Fed has complete ability to control the funds rate.  
The reason to question the Fed’s ability to control the funds rate is that, at lower 
frequencies, changes in the demand for reserves become a potential influence on their 
market price. 
 The market for reserves is depicted in Figure 1.  The perfectly inelastic supply curve 
represents the quantity of reserves the Fed has supplied to the market, via open market 
operations, at time t.  The demand for reserves is the banking system’s demand and its 
position is influenced primarily by the private sector’s demand for loans.  Panel A depicts 
what is labeled as an “official interpretation” of changes in the funds rate:  The demand for 
reserves is static and all changes in the funds rate occur only because of the Fed’s open 
market operations and shifts in the supply of reserves provided to the banking system.  
Panel B depicts an “alternative interpretation” in which the private sector demand for loans 
moves cyclically with real income. 5  In this representation, the observed value of the funds 
rate would change because of changes in the public sector’s demand for loans.  Moreover, if 
changes in the private sector’s demand for credit generally were changing, it should be 
observed that other short-term interest rates were moving in conjunction with the funds 
rate if Panel B is a better description of how the funds rate evolves over time. 
 To distinguish between the alternatives empirically, we first conduct tests of 
Granger causality between the following pairs of variables.  The first pair is the funds rate 
and total loans and leases.  Recalling that the funds rate must be strictly exogenous to 
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other influences if it is to be called the Fed’s instrument, a finding of unidirectional or bi-
directional causality from total loans and leases to the funds rate would be damaging to 
this designation.  In terms of economics, this statistical finding merely would indicate that 
movements in the demand for reserves are significant in determining the value of the funds 
rate, an observation counter to the conventional wisdom that the funds rate is strictly 
under the Fed’s control 
 A second test of causality can be carried out between the funds rate and the three-
month T-bill rate.  Under this conjecture, changes in the market demand for credit will 
move market rates in general and, in particular, the short term market rate (the T-bill rate).  
If the Fed, as it has been implementing policy for most of the past four decades, is 
attempting to maintain the fed funds rate at a pre-determined target value and market 
rates change in response to a change in the demand for credit (and, presumably, a change 
in real income), the Fed may have to alter its target for the funds rate at some point to 
“catch up” with credit market conditions.  In this case, causality will be found to run not 
from the funds rate to the T-bill rate but in the opposite direction.  As in the previous case, 
this result will be damaging to claims that the funds rate is the Fed’s monetary policy 
instrument. 
 Finally, the most direct test of the funds rate as policy instrument can be conducted 
by examining the relationship between it and bank reserves.  Unlike the funds rate, which 
is a market-determined price, the quantity of reserves is product of the Fed’s open market 
operations.  Unidirectional causality running from reserves to the funds rate would 
establish reserves as the Fed’s instrument of policy and relegate the funds rate to another 
role – perhaps indicator or intermediate target – as it was thought at the beginning of the 
decade. 
Results 
 The three relationships discussed above were examined over two sample periods 
using monthly data.  The sample periods are:  1960 – 1979 and 1985 – 2007.  The first 
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sample pre-dates the experiment with monetary targeting and the worst of the high 
inflation experience.  This sub-sample, however, covers the period when the United States 
still was under the Gold Standard and during which it conducted some specific interest 
rate experiments such as “Operation Twist.”  The second sample begins after the 
experiment with monetary targeting had ended, inflation had been brought down 
substantially and the post-inflation recovery was well-established.  Moreover, this latter 
period is one in which the Fed explicitly paid more attention to the funds rate as its target 
and the professional literature increasingly began to refer to the funds rate as the Fed’s 
instrument of policy.   
Prior to conducting these tests, however, each variable was tested for stationarity 
and results of these preliminary tests are reported in Table 1. The results indicate that 
funds rate, the three month T-bill rate and unemployment rate are stationary in first 
differences.  The results for the remaining variables are mixed.  The growth rate for the 
chained deflator for personal consumption expenditures is not stationary in either sub-
sample.  In the second period, the growth rates of non-borrowed reserves, total loans and 
leases made by commercial banks and real personal consumption expenditures also are 
non-stationary.  The growth rate of real disposable personal income, the remaining variable 
to be considered, is stationary in both periods. 
 The upper panel of Table 2 reports the results of tests for Granger causality among 
these series for the pre-1979 sub-sample.  Among the more interesting results is a finding 
of bi-directional causality between the T-bill rate and the funds rate.  Strong unidirectional 
causation is found running from the funds rate to non-borrowed reserves as well as from 
total loans and leases to the funds rate.  Whatever one is to make of these results – whether 
it is the influence of the Gold Standard on the Fed’s operations or the identification of a Fed 
reaction function or some other phenomenon in the data – it is difficult to identify the 
federal funds rate as an exogenous policy instrument in the 1960 – 1979 period. 
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 Results for the 1985 – 2007 sub-sample are reported in the bottom panel of Table 2 
and only a few results differ from the earlier period.  The growth rate of total loans and 
leases no longer Granger-causes changes in the funds rate and, unlike the earlier period, 
changes in the funds rate and the growth rate of non-borrowed reserves now are unrelated.  
Changes in the T-bill rate and the funds rate still exhibit strong bi-directional causality, 
however, with the T-bill rate, in terms of statistical significance, having the more dominant 
influence.  Finally, although the specifics have changed in a few cases, the general results 
still seem to reject the specific proposition that the funds rate meets the exogeneity 
criterion required to be the Fed’s monetary policy instrument. 
 For more insight on how these results might be interpreted, Granger (1980) offers 
these thoughts on the specific case of a policy variable where strong priors are held: 
“Some variables are such that prior beliefs will be strong that they are exogenous:  
An example is that weather is probably exogenous to the economy.  However, other 
variables have often been considered to be exogenous yet need to be tested, the best 
examples being the control variables.  One can argue that a government controlled 
interest rate is in fact partly determined by previous movements elsewhere in the 
economy, and so is not strictly exogenous.  The true exogenous part of such a 
variable is that which cannot be forecast from other variables and its own past and 
it follows that it is only this part that has any policy impact.  The theory of rational 
expectations is relevant here……….. 
 
The effect of the presence of control variables on causality was considered by Sims 
(1977).   It is certainly possible that the actions of a controller can lead to what 
appears to be a causal relationship between two variables.  Equally, it is possible 
that two variables that would be causally related if no controls were used would 
seem to be unrelated in the presence of a control.  It also may be worth pointing out 
that controllability is a much deeper property than causality, in my opinion, 
although some writers have confused the two concepts.  If Y causes X, it does not 
necessarily mean that Y can be used to control X……It seems quite possible that 
some variables used in the past by governments to control may be so ineffectual 
that causation will not be found, so that testing is worthwhile. (p.    ) “ 
 
Finally, on another point crucial to the current discussion, Granger notes that “the 
possibility of ‘instantaneous causation’ obviously greatly complicates the problem of how to 
test for exogeneity.”  With the Fed typically conducting an Open Market Operation each day 
and the demand side of the fed funds market subject to changes in expectations as well as 
other influences within the monthly frequency of the data, this latter concern is very real. 
 9 
 In sum, testing for exogeneity remains a tricky proposition.  When reviewing the 
economics of the reserves market, however, it seems clear that the funds rate is an 
endogenously-determined price and the supply of reserves an exogenously-determined 
quantity, even if its position is influenced by the desire of policy makers to engineer an 
intersection with the reserves demand curve such that a particular value for the funds rate 
prevails.  With these priors about the economics of the federal funds market and the 
Granger causality tests in table 2, considering the federal funds rate as a policy 
“instrument” seems to be incorrect.  
Is the Federal Funds Rate an Indicator Variable? 
 In their influential 1992 paper, Bernanke and Blinder labeled the federal funds rate 
as an indicator variable for monetary policy.  Unlike any variable that is part of a monetary 
policy mechanism as described in either (a) or (b) earlier, an indicator variable is simply a 
variable that provides a reliable signal of the stance of monetary policy.  The central bank is 
not presumed to control its behavior and is not presumed to be targeting a path for it but, if 
its behavior is monitored by the public, the signal in the funds rate will carry valuable 
information about the future behavior of the Fed’s goal variables.  Their study found the 
funds rate to be a strong indicator of monetary policy actions and in conjunction with 
negative empirical results for the Fed’s official monetary aggregates, the funds rate began to 
receive more attention in both policy and academic circles as the 1990s progressed. 6 
 By way of re-examining the influence of the funds rate on aggregate activity, bi-
variate causality tests were conducted between the funds rate and four monthly data series 
likely to be consistent with the Fed’s “dual mandate” to achieve goals for price stability and 
full employment:  real disposable personal income (rdpi), real personal consumption 
expenditures (rpce), the aggregate price level (p, as measured by the Personal Consumption 
Expenditure Deflator) and  the civilian unemployment rate (U).  Prior to testing, all 
variables were differenced appropriately according to the ADF tests reported earlier.  These 
results, for both sub-samples, are reported in Table 3. 
 10 
 For the pre-1980 sub-sample, the results indicate that changes in the funds rate 
had significant effects on both presumed goals of monetary policy:  They led the inflation 
rate and changes in the unemployment rate.  For proponents of a short-run Phillips Curve 
relationship and the Fed’s ability to exploit the inflation-unemployment tradeoff by 
manipulating the funds rate, these results would be consistent with that story.  A caution 
to this interpretation is that reverse causation also runs from changes in the 
unemployment rate to changes in the funds rate. 
In the post-1984 period, when the Fed presumably focused more closely on an 
objective of price stability and announced specific targets for the funds rate in its 
implementation of monetary policy, changes in the funds rate no longer have a significant 
causal relationship with the inflation rate.  Changes in the funds rate continue to show a 
causal influence on changes in the unemployment rate but, as in the earlier period, the 
causation is bi-directional.  Changes in the funds rate also now show a significant influence 
on the growth in real disposable real income as well but strong reverse causation from 
growth in real personal consumption expenditures to changes in the funds rate not present 
in the earlier period now is found.  Overall, in both sub-samples, changes in the funds rate 
do appear to contain information about future movements in aggregate variables likely to 
be the objectives of monetary policy actions and, as such, the funds rate can be thought of 
as an indicator variable.  At the same time, movements in some of the candidate goal 
variables appear to contain information about future movements in the funds rate. 
The results in Table 3, however, may overstate the influence, or information content, 
of changes in the funds rate if Granger’s comments regarding innovations and the truly 
exogenous component of a series were to form the basis of testing.  Accepting the notion 
that the part of the funds rate series that is relevant for discussions of policy is that part of 
the monthly changes which cannot be forecast from their own history and other variables, 
we estimate an equation of the form: 
 (1)  ΔFFt = a + b1* ΔFFt-1 + b2 * ΔTbillt-1 + b3 * Release + et 
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where Release is a dummy variable that takes a value of one beginning at 1994.02 to mark 
the point at which the Fed adopted a policy of announcing its policy change -- specifically, 
any change in its stated target value for the funds rate -- to the public immediately after 
FOMC meetings rather than with a 45-day lag as had been the case prior to this date.  
Although financial market participants had invested resources in trying to forecast what 
the Fed might do or, in fact, had done at a specific FOMC meeting before the February 1994 
change in Fed practices regarding public release of its Directive, this date marks a 
fundamental change in the time series relationships between what the public believed to be 
true and what was formally announced to it in an official statement of what the Fed had 
decided to do. 
 Estimating the relationship in (1) produces an innovations series for the 1985.01 – 
2007.12 period, which is shown in Figure 2.  Experimenting with longer lags and inserting 
other variables, such as the reserves or loans series, did not add significant information to 
the results.  And while the Release variable was not statistically significant, its inclusion 
was important for stability of the equation.  Moreover, a Chow test found a significant 
breakpoint in the equation at 1994.02. 
 Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to be drawn from Figure 2 is that, after 
relatively large volatility in the period immediately following the abandonment of monetary 
targeting and, at least publicly, experimentation with the P-star model for inflation 
targeting, the fed funds innovations series has tended to vary within a symmetric 40 basis 
point band, centered on zero.  A prominent deviation from this pattern, however, occurs in 
the slow-growth period of 2000 – 2002. Whether by accident or design, in the aftermath of 
its injections of liquidity prior to the Y2K phenomenon, the Fed engaged in highly 
contractionary reserves operations early in 2000; to some observers, the downturn in real 
activity that followed was a classical, monetary-induced recession.  To others, the recession 
was the product of prior contractionary moves by Fed, as measured by increases in the 
federal funds rate from 4.75 percent in 1998 to 6.5 percent by early 2001.  Data to support 
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the alternative interpretations are shown in the upper and lower panels of Figure 3.  Thus, 
while an economic downturn did occur (as designated by NBER) between March and 
November of 2001, the proximate cause – which transmission mechanism – linked a precise 
monetary policy action to the observed result is more a matter of accepted wisdom than by 
empirical testing.   
 Employing the innovations series for the funds rate allows us to re-estimate the 
causality relationships between measures of aggregate economic activity and a measure of 
monetary policy more in the spirit of rational expectations and more likely to meet the 
concept of exogeneity as discussed by Granger.  The results of this experiment, for the 
1985.01 – 2007.12 sub-sample, are reported in the top panel of Table 4. 
 When innovations in the funds rate replace actual changes in the funds rate, the 
results indicate that the significant information content of the funds rate disappears.  
Although there is a weak (prob. = 0.0_) association between innovations in the funds rate 
and the inflation rate, the only significant relationships in the table’s top panel are reverse 
causation running from the growth rate of real personal consumption expenditures and 
changes in the unemployment rate to changes in the unemployment rate.   Thus, at least 
for the measures of aggregate activity examined here, the exogenous component of changes 
in the funds rate appears to have a non-significant policy effect. 
 Repeating the same exercise for the growth rates of non-borrowed reserves indicates 
that innovations in reserves growth appear to have significant effects on two measures of 
real activity:  Growth in real disposable personal income and real personal consumption 
expenditures.  This finding is consistent with a traditional monetarist story that short-run 
deviations in quantitative variables (reserves, the monetary base or money) from the growth 
paths will have effects on real variables.  The other significant finding, reverse causation 
from the inflation rate to innovations in the growth in non-borrowed reserves, could be 
interpreted as a result of inflation smoothing under a Taylor Rule environment:  If the 
central bank responded to new information about inflation by changing its path for reserves 
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growth, this behavior would explain this finding.  This also is consistent with a feedback 
interpretation of the reverse causation running from real variables to the funds rate 
discussed above. 
VAR Estimation 
 To this point, the funds rate has been examined in a piecemeal fashion, in bi-variate 
relationships with variables thought to have some potential to influence the behavior of the 
funds rate or variables commonly thought to be goals of monetary policy if the funds rate 
were the Fed’s intermediate target variable.  To examine the funds rate more systematically 
and allow for possible interactions among these variables, we estimated a VAR over the 
same two sub-samples and included in the model the eight variables that have been part of 
the foregoing analysis:  the funds rate, the three-month T-bill rate, the unemployment rate, 
non-borrowed reserves, total loans and leases, real disposable personal income, real 
personal consumption expenditures, and the chained PCE deflator.  As in the foregoing, 
each series is transformed and differenced appropriately prior to estimation.  The results 
for the federal funds rate equation are shown in Table 5. 
 The first striking feature of this equation, for both sub-samples, is its relatively low 
explanatory power.  In the pre-1980 period, lagged first differences in both the T-bill rate 
and the unemployment rate are significant in explaining changes in the funds rate, with a 
somewhat stronger effect coming from the unemployment rate.  This finding is consistent 
with the earlier causality test results and the general idea that the Fed, prior to 1980, may 
have been implementing monetary policy with real activity as its primary objective.  The 
results for the post-1984 sample indicate that, while both changes in the T-bill rate and 
unemployment rate still affect changes in the funds rate, the influence of the T-bill rate now 
is much stronger and its coefficient has more than doubled (from 0.20 to 0.46).  As in the 
earlier causality test results, however, this closer association between changes in the T-bill 
rate and funds rate, leaves undetermined whether changes in the T-bill rate are the product 
of financial market conditions that subsequently cause the central bank to adjust the funds 
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rate or whether the T-bill rate changes in response to changes in the funds rate.  Whatever 
the case may be, the two interest rate series are linked more closely in the post-1984 
sample and while the effect of changes in the unemployment rate on the funds rate 
remains.  
Testing for Nonlinearity 
 The foregoing allowed more interactions among variables but maintained an 
assumption that relationships these series linear.  The assumption of linearity may be 
tenuous in view of evidence to the contrary in regard to macroeconomic time series (see, 
e.g., Neftci (1984), Brock and Sayers (1988) and Valderrama (2007)).  Moreover, when 
designing a feedback rule for monetary policy, such as a Taylor Rule, its success in 
implementation will depend on whether its assumptions of linearity are parsimonious with 
the behavior of the time series involved; evidence of significant non-linearities in the data 
would undermine an assumption of such rules and, at a minimum, call for a revision in 
them that would add a degree of complexity not currently displayed in their simple designs. 
 To test for nonlinearity in the series used in this paper, we utilize the research 
framework originally proposed in Hinich and Patterson (1995), which seeks to detect 
epochs of transient serial dependence in a discrete-time pure white noise process. 7 The  
procedure divides the full sample period into equal-length, non-overlapping, moving time 
windows of arbitrary length and then computes the portmanteau correlation, bi-correlation 
and tri-correlation test statistics (denoted as C , H  and 4H  statistics)  for each window to 
detect linear and nonlinear serial dependence .  
 
To understand the concept of the test, let the sequence ( ){ }tx  denote the sampled 
data process, where the time unit, ,t  is an integer.  Because test procedure employs non-
overlapped time windows, and we denote n  as the window length, then the -thk  window 
can be written as: ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1,...,1, −++ ntxtxtx kkk . The next non-overlapped window is 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ },1,...,1, 111 −++ +++ ntxtxtx kkk  where 1 .k kt t n+ = +  Define ( )Z t  as the sequence of 
standardized observations obtained from: 
( ) ( )
x
x
s
mtx
tZ
−=                                      (1) 
for each nt ,...,2,1=  where xm and xs  are the sample mean and sample standard deviation 
of the window. 
 
The null hypothesis for each time window is that the transformed data ( ){ }Z t  are 
realizations of a stationary pure white noise process. Thus, under the null hypothesis, the 
correlations ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0,0 ≠∀=+= rrtZtZErCZZ , the bi-correlations 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] srstZrtZtZEsrCZZZ ,,0, ∀=++=  except when 0== sr , and the tricorrelations 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] vandsrvtZstZrtZtZEvsrCZZZZ ,,,0,, ∀=+++=  except when 0=== vsr . 
The alternative hypothesis is that the process in the window has some non-zero 
correlations, bicorrelations or tricorrelations in the set Lvsr <<<<0 , where L  is the 
number of lags that define the window. In other words, if there exists second-order linear or 
third- or fourth-order nonlinear serial dependence in the data generating process, then 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,0,,0 ≠≠≠ vsrCorsrCrC ZZZZZZZZZ  for at least one r  value or one pair of r  and 
s  values or one triple of vandsr,  values, respectively.  
 
The r  sample correlation coefficient is: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑−
=
+−=
rn
t
ZZ rtZtZrn
rC
1
1
                                               (2) 
 
The C  statistic is developed to test for the existence of non-zero correlations (i.e. linear 
dependence) within a window, and its corresponding distribution is: 
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( )[ ]∑
=
≈=
L
r
LZZ rCC
1
22 .χ                                                  (3) 
 
The ( ),r s  sample bicorrelation coefficient is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑−
=
++−=
sn
t
ZZZ stZrtZtZsn
srC
1
,1,  for sr ≤≤0 .                                     (4) 
 
The H statistic is designed to test for the existence of non-zero bi-correlations (i.e. third-
order nonlinear serial dependence) within a window, and its corresponding distribution is: 
( ) ( )∑∑
=
−
=
−≈=
L
s
s
r
LLsrGH
2
1
1
2
2/1
2 , χ                                    (5) 
where ( ) ( )srCsnsrG ZZZ ,, −= .  
 
The ( )vsr ,,  sample tri-correlation coefficient is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑−
=
+++−=
vn
t
ZZZZ vtZstZrtZtZvn
vsrC
1
,1,,  for vsr ≤≤≤0 .                (6) 
The 4H statistic is designed to test for the existence of non-zero tri-correlations (i.e. fourth-
order nonlinear serial dependence) within a window, and its corresponding distribution is: 
( ) ( )( )∑∑∑
=
−
=
−
=
−−≈=
L
v
v
s
s
r
LLLvsrTH
3
1
2
1
1
2
3/21
3 ,,4 χ                        (7) 
where  ( ) ( )vsrCvnvsrT ZZZZ ,,,, ×−= .  
The autocorrelation structure in each window is removed by an autoregressive AR(p) 
fit, in which the number of lags is selected such that there is no significant C  statistic at 
the specified threshold level. 8 It is worth highlighting that the AR fitting is employed purely 
as a pre-whitening operation, and not to obtain a model of best fit. The portmanteau 
bicorrelation and tricorrelation tests then are applied to the residuals of the fitted model of 
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each data window such that any further rejection of the null hypothesis of pure white noise 
is due only to significant H  or 4H statistics.  
The number of lags L  is specified as bL n=  with 5.00 << b  for the correlation and 
bi-correlation test and 33.00 << b  for the tri-correlation test, where b  is a parameter 
under the choice of the user. Based on the results of Monte Carlo simulations, Hinich and 
Patterson (1995, 2005) recommended the use of 0.4b =  (in relation to the bi-correlation 
test) which is a good compromise between: (1) using the asymptotic result as a valid 
approximation for the sampling properties of H  statistic for moderate sample sizes; and (2) 
having enough sample bi-correlations in the statistic to have reasonable power against non-
independent variates. In making a choice about the length of the windows for the test, a 
tradeoff is faced between increasing the power the test with longer lags increasing the 
uncertainty on the event time when the serial dependence occurs.  The choice also is 
constrained by the number of available observations. In this study, the data are split into 
non-overlapping moving time windows of twenty four observations. 9  A small portion of the 
results of these tests for the pre-1980 sample are reported in Table 6; the results for the 
post-1984 sample period are reported in Table 7.  
The general story of tables 6 and 7 is that the relationships among the variables in 
the eight variable VAR are subject to episodic non-linearities not captured within the 
framework of a simple feedback system such as a Taylor Rule.  For example, in the pre-
1980 sub-sample, the residuals from the rate equation and the non-borrowed reserves 
equation are revealed to share a non-linear relationship in two different frames (1961.03 – 
1963.02 and 1975.03 – 1977.02) and to indicate several different types of significant 
relationships:  significant 3rd order nonlinear bicovariance (xxy) and significant 3rd order 
nonlinear bicovariance of the covariance of y with the level of x (yyx).  This same window 
appears to be important for other relationships as well, revealing significant non-linearities 
between the residuals from the funds rate and loans equations, the residuals from the non-
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borrowed reserves equation against the residuals from, respectively, the loans, inflation, 
and T-bill rate equations.  The funds rate and inflation also are related in the second frame 
(1963.03 – 1965.02). 
In the post-1984 sub-sample, only the particular results are changed but episodic 
non-linearity is again present among the VAR’s key variables.  Frame 1 (1985.01 – 1986.12) 
now appears to be the key window for significant results but the 1997.01 – 1998.12 window 
(frame 7) also produces evidence of non-linearity.  As in the earlier period, residuals from 
the funds rate equation and the non-borrowed reserves equation again produce several 
significant statistics (yyx, yyy) but now, the funds rate residuals also are related to the 
residuals of the T-bill rate equation in a significantly non-linear way (yyx, yyy) in the 
seventh frame.  As in the earlier sub-sample, the residuals from the non-borrowed reserves 
equation show a significant relationship with the residuals from the loans, inflation and T-
bill rate equations.  Over all, not only are the residuals from the eight equations in the 
foregoing VAR not independent but they share, at least for episodes in the data, complex 
non-linear relationships are inconsistent with the linear, time-invariant structure of simple 
feedback rules such as a Taylor Rule. 
Conclusions 
 The federal funds rate is the centerpiece of monetary policy in the United States.  
For more than a decade, economists have referred to it as the central bank’s instrument of 
policy, presuming that it is an exogenous variable that can be set by the Federal Reserve’s 
actions without feedback from competitive market actions.  Moreover, both economists and 
lay observers alike have monitored changes in the funds rate for indications about the 
likely future paths for inflation, output growth and other key economic variables.  Finally, 
although a Taylor Rule has not been formally adopted by the Fed as a model to guide its 
policy decisions, monetary economists have come to it include as an equation in standard 
models of aggregate activity. 
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 This paper has questioned each of these premises about the funds rate and the 
empirical evidence, across two sample periods, finds each to be in doubt.  Although the 
usefulness of causality tests to resolve the question of exogeneity is a matter of debate, the 
results of these tests do indicate that the funds rate shares significant interactions with 
other variables suggested by alternative hypotheses about how the funds rate could be 
determined endogenously – as an intermediate target variable – rather than as an 
instrument of policy.  While this may seem like a minor quibble to modern audiences, the 
issue between an exogenous money supply and one determined endogenously was among 
the key issues that formed the debate between those who supported interest rates v. money 
as intermediate targets in the 1960s. 
 With regard to the funds rate as an indicator variable, the results show that, once 
the funds rate is purged of the information contained in its own past, little significant 
information remains between changes in it and other variables.  In contrast, innovations in 
non-borrowed reserves have significant effects real disposable income and personal 
consumption expenditures.  Rather than offering leading signals for the paths of other 
variables of interest, innovations in the funds rate seem to be more likely tied to Fed 
responses to paths in potential goal variables of monetary policy.  Estimation of an eight-
variable VAR confirmed the results of the causality tests by revealing low explanatory power 
and changes in Fed operating procedures over time:  Responding relatively more to real 
variables (unemployment) prior to 1980 and shifting relatively more to interest rate 
smoothing since 1985. 
 Finally, with Taylor’s (1993) work playing a key role in standard monetary models, 
its assumptions of linearity and structural stability were examined.  Test results for only a 
few residual pairs among the many possibilities within the estimated VAR revealed multiple 
examples of episodic non-linearity among the system’s key variables:  The federal funds 
rate, non-borrowed reserves, total loans and leases, the PCE deflator and the T-bill rate.  
Because implementation of a Taylor Rule presumes linearity in the data and an unchanged 
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structure over time, these findings suggest that any attempt to use this type of interest rate 
rule in practice will lead to an unstable path for the central bank’s chosen objective. 
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Table 1.  Results of Unit Root Tests  
Time Period 
Variable  1960.01 – 1979.12   1985.01 – 2007.12  
ΔFF    -7.21     -10.70 
 
ΔTB    -12.00     -6.85 
 
ΔU    -7.36     -7.61 
 
ΔlnNBR   -4.56     -2.58* 
         (-6.71) 
 
ΔlnLoans   -3.48     -2.18* 
         (-5.77) 
 
Δlnrdpi   -3.22     -5.37 
 
Δlnrpce   -3.23     -2.41* 
         (-5.62) 
 
ΔlnPCEDef   -0.77*     -1.71* 
    (-4.04)     (-6.56) 
 
NOTES:  An asterisk next to a test statistic indicates the presence of a unit root in the 
series.  Values in parentheses are test statistics applied to second differences of the series. 
-2.87 is the 0.05 critical value. 
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Table 2.  Results for Tests of Granger Causality:  Is the Funds Rate a Monetary Policy  
    Instrument? 
 
1960.01 – 1979.12 Sub-sample (n= 210) 
 Null Hypothesis:   F-statistic 
ΔFF ≠> ΔTB    7.65* 
ΔTB ≠> ΔFF    3.46* 
ΔFF ≠> ΔdlnNBR   6.54* 
ΔdlnNBR ≠> ΔFF   0.43 
ΔFF ≠> ΔdlnLoans   1.89 
ΔdlnLoans ≠> ΔFF   2.46* 
 
1985.01 – 2007.12 Sub-sample (n=276) 
Null Hypothesis:   F-statistic 
ΔFF ≠> ΔTB    3.13* 
ΔTB ≠> ΔFF    12.72* 
ΔFF ≠> ΔΔdlnNBR   1.23 
ΔΔdlnNBR ≠> ΔFF   1.63 
ΔFF ≠> ΔΔdlnLoans   7.05* 
ΔΔdlnLoans ≠> ΔFF   2.73* 
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Table 3.  Results for Tests of Granger Causality:  Is the Funds Rate an Indicator of  
              Monetary Policy Actions? 
 
 
1960.01 – 1979.12 Sub-sample 
        
Null Hypothesis:       
    
ΔFF ≠> ΔΔlnp    3.50*    
ΔΔlnp ≠> ΔFF    2.88* 
ΔFF ≠> Δdlnrdpi    0.28 
Δdlnrdpi ≠> ΔFF   1.56 
ΔFF ≠> Δdlnrpce   0.97 
Δdlnrpce ≠> ΔFF   2.65* 
ΔFF ≠> ΔU    2.19* 
ΔU ≠> ΔFF    4.67* 
1985.01 – 2007.12 Sub-sample 
        
Null Hypothesis:        
ΔFF ≠> ΔΔlnp    2.16     
ΔΔlnp ≠> ΔFF    3.03*     
ΔFF ≠> Δlnrdpi    2.47*     
Δdlnrdpi ≠> ΔFF   1.41     
ΔFF ≠> ΔΔlnrpce   4.07*     
ΔΔdlnrpce ≠> ΔFF   2.60*     
ΔFF ≠> ΔU    2.64*     
ΔU ≠> ΔFF    3.81*     
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Table 4.  The Effects of Innovations in the Funds Rate and Reserves on Economic Activity, 
1985.01 – 2007.12 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis:   Innovations in the Funds Rate 
 
ΔFF ≠> Δlnp    2.01    
Δlnp ≠> ΔFF    0.69 
ΔFF ≠> Δdlnrdpi    1.78 
Δdlnrdpi ≠> ΔFF   1.38 
ΔFF ≠> Δdlnrpce   0.45 
Δdlnrpce ≠> ΔFF   3.46* 
ΔFF ≠> ΔU    1.53 
ΔU ≠> ΔFF    3.58* 
    Innovations in  Growth of   
Null Hypothesis:  Nonborrowed Reserves    
ΔR ≠> Δlnp    1.08     
Δlnp ≠> ΔR    2.98*     
ΔR ≠> Δlnrdpi     2.18*     
Δdlnrdpi ≠> ΔR   1.79     
ΔR ≠> Δlnrpce    4.37*     
Δdlnrpce ≠> ΔR   0.29     
ΔR ≠> ΔU    0.95     
ΔU ≠> ΔR    1.72     
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Table 5.  Results of VAR Estimation 
Dependent Variable:  First Difference of Federal Funds Rate 
Variable  1960.01 – 1979.12   1985.01 – 2007.12  
ΔlnNBRt-1  -0.00  (0.26)    0.00  (1.24) 
ΔlnNBRt-2  0.02  (1.24)    0.00  (0.44) 
ΔlnRDPIt-1  0.01  (0.18)    -0.01  (0.70) 
ΔlnRDPIt-2  0.00  (0.04)    0.02  (0.80) 
ΔlnLOANSt-1  0.00  (0.62)    0.01  (0.08) 
ΔlnLOANSt-2  -0.02  (0.27)    0.02  (1.23) 
ΔFedFundst-1  0.12  (1.51)    0.02  (0.22)  
ΔFedFundst-2  0.10  (1.25)    -0.06 (0.80)  
ΔlnRPCEt-1  -0.01  (0.32)    0.00  (0.50) 
ΔlnRPCEt-2  0.02  (0.43)    0.02  (0.99) 
ΔΔlnPt-1  0.11  (0.78)    0.06  (1.29) 
ΔΔlnPt-2  0.16  (1.21)    0.69  (1.44) 
ΔTBt-1   0.20  (2.12) *    0.46  (6.34) *   
ΔTBt-2   -0.08  (0.80)    0.11  (1.46)  
ΔUt-1   -0.46  (2.84) *    -0.25  (3.03) * 
ΔUt-2   -0.24  (1.44)    0.08  (0.97) 
C   -0.23  (2.05) *    -0.04  (1.69) 
R2   0.29     0.41 
NOTE:  For the 1985 – 2007 sub-sample, ΔlnNBR, ΔlnRPCE and ΔlnLoans and replaced by 
their second differences to be compatible with the stationarity tests reported in Table 1. 
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Table 6.  Results of the Tests for Non-linearity in the Residuals from the VAR Estimation 
1961.01 – 1979.12 Estimation Period 
Fed Funds Rate – Nonborrowed Reserves 
 Frame 1 (1961.03 – 1963.02): xxy:  p-value =  0.000 
 Frame 8 (1975.03 – 1977.02)  xxy:  p-value = 0.100 
      yyx:  p-value = 0.000 
Fed Funds Rate – Loans 
 Frame 8 (1975.03 – 1977.02): xxy:  p-value = 0.004 
Fed Funds Rate – Inflation 
 Frame 2 (1963.03 – 1965.02): yyy:  p-value = 0.026 
Non-borrowed Reserves – Loans 
 Frame 8 (1975.03 – 1977.02): xxy:  p-value = 0.000 
Non-borrowed Reservers – Inflation 
 Frame 8 (1975.03 – 1977.02): xxy:  p-value = 0.000 
Non-borrrowed Reserves – T-bill Rate  
 Frame 8 (1975.03 – 1977.02): xxy:  p-value = 0.000 
 
NOTES: xxy is the Hinich test statistic for the 3rd order nonlinear bicovariance of the 
covariance of x with the level of y in that frame. yyx is the Hinich test statistic for the 3rd 
order nonlinear bicovariance of the covariance of y with the level of x in that frame. yyy is 
the Hinich test statistic for the 3rd order nonlinear covariance of y in that frame. 
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Table 7.  Results of the Tests for Non-linearity in the Residuals from the VAR Estimation  
1985.01 – 2007.12 Estimation Period 
Fed Funds Rate – Nonborrowed Reserves 
 Frame 1 (1985.01 – 1986.12): yyx:  p-value = 0.000 
      yyy:  p-value = 0.006 
Fed Funds Rate – T-bill Rate 
 Frame 7 (1997.01 – 1998.12): yyx:  p-value = 0.007 
      yyy:  p-value = 0.069 
Nonborrowed Reserves – Loans 
 Frame 1 (1985.01 – 1986.12): xxx:  p-value = 0.006 
Nonborrowed Reserves – Inflation 
 Frame 1 (1985.01 – 1986.12)  xxy:  p-value = 0.000 
      xxx:  p-value = 0.006 
Nonborrowed Reserves – T-bill Rate 
 Frame 1 (1985.01 – 1986.12)  xxy:  p-value = 0.000 
      xxx:  p-value = 0.006 
      yyy:  p-value = 0.069 
 
 
NOTES: xxy is the Hinich test statistic for the 3rd order nonlinear bicovariance of the 
covariance of x with the level of y in that frame. yyx is the Hinich test statistic for the 3rd 
order nonlinear bicovariance of the covariance of y with the level of x in that frame. yyy is 
the Hinich test statistic for the 3rd order nonlinear covariance of y in that frame.  xxx is the 
Hinich test statistic for the 3rd order nonlinear covariance of x in that frame. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Alternative Interpretations of Movements in the Federal Funds Rate 
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Figure 2.  Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate, 1985 - 2007
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Figure 3.  Two Interpretations of the 2001 Recession 
Reserve growth slows substantially before the downturn and increases rapidly prior to the 
recovery:  Standard monetary story of the cycle 
  
Conventional wisdom: The funds rate target increases before the downturn and falls before 
the recovery 
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ENDNOTES 
                                              
1 See, for example, Tobin (1969) 
 
2 Although the funds rate appears on the left-hand side of a Taylor-rule equation, this is a 
different kind of “endogeneity” than one in which a price, such as the funds rate, is 
determined by the interaction of the supply and demand of reserves. 
3 See Cochrane (2007a, b) 
 
4 Briefly, if the two errors are large and offsetting, the more complicated policy strategy, (b), 
may produce a smaller overall error than the simpler policy strategy described in (a).  See 
the Andersen and Karnosky (1977) for more detail on this topic. 
5 For more discussion of how a misinterpretation of this figure and how a misinterpretation 
of the source of changes in the funds rate can lead to monetary policy mistakes, see 
Belongia (2007).  Mistakes of this sort would lead to the pattern of procyclical money 
growth long-described by monetarists and also would serve as the source of post-World 
War II business cycle fluctuations; see, for example, Meltzer (1991). 
6 The negative findings for relationships between the Fed’s official simple sum monetary 
aggregates and measures of economic activity are to be contrasted with the positive results 
reported not only for the United States, but other countries as well, when money was 
measured as a superlative – Fisher Ideal or Divisia – index.   A collection of these results 
can be found in Belongia and Binner (2000).  The specific question of sensitivity of 
inference to measurement is addressed in Belongia (1996). 
7   This was published as Hinich and Patterson (2005). 
 
8  In the literature in particular those on long-term dependence, pre-filtering by means of 
an AR-GARCH procedure is commonly adopted to remove short-term autocorrelation and 
time-varying volatility. However, this procedure is unnecessary since the bi-correlation and 
tri-correlation tests rely on the property that the bi-correlation and tri-correlation 
coefficients equal zero for a pure noise process, and the null hypothesis is only rejected 
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when there exists some non-zero bi-correlations or tri-correlations suggesting nonlinear 
serial dependence in the conditional mean (additive nonlinearity), but not the presence of 
conditional variance dependence (conditional heteroskedasticity). 
9 In principle, this window length needs to be sufficiently long enough to apply the bi-
correlation and tri-correlation tests with some power and yet short enough for the data 
generating process to have remained roughly constant (see Monte Carlo results in Hinich, 
1996; Hinich and Patterson, 1995, 2005). 
